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Abstract—Recent work on cooperative communications has
demonstrated benefits in terms of improving the reliability of
links through diversity and/or increasing the reach of a link
compared to a single transmitter transmitting to a single receiver
(single-input single-output or SISO). In one form of cooperative
transmissions, multiple nodes can act as virtual antenna elements
and provide such benefits using space-time coding. In a multi-hop
sensor network, a source node can make use of its neighbors as
relays with itself to reach an intermediate node, which will use
its neighbors and so on to reach the destination. For the same
reliability of a link as SISO, the number of hops between a source
and destination may be reduced using cooperative transmissions.
However, the presence of malicious or compromised nodes in
the network impacts the use of cooperative transmissions. Using
more relays can increase the reach of a link, but if one or more
relays are malicious, the transmission may fail. In this paper, we
analyze this problem to understand the conditions under which
cooperative transmissions may fare better or worse than SISO
transmissions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative diversity is a relatively new physical layer
approach which helps to achieve performance gains similar to
multiple-input multi-output (MIMO) enabled transmissions in
wireless networks compared to traditional single-input single-
output (SISO) links. With cooperative transmissions, several
nodes with single antennas form a virtual antenna array to
assist each other with the transmission of messages. When
a virtual antenna array is created only for transmitting to a
single receiving node, the approach is called virtual multiple-
input single-output (vMISO) [1]. The way vMISO works is
as follows. A cooperative transmission is initiated by a source
node multi-casting (or broadcasting) a message to a number
of cooperating relay nodes, which then send the message to
the destination node (together with the source node) using
techniques such as space-time coding. The destination node
combines the signals from the source and relays appropriately
to decode the message. Cooperative transmissions exploit
a fundamental feature of the wireless medium: the ability
to achieve diversity through independent channels created
between the multiple transmitters and the receiver, because
these channels are likely to fade independently. The resulting
advantages (widely studied previously at the physical layer
[2]) are a better bit-error rate (BER) for a given transmission
rate and/or a longer transmission range for a given BER while
consuming the same amount of transmission power compared
to non-cooperative transmissions. These advantages can also
provide energy efficient routing and a longer lifetime for
sensor networks. From a security point of view, cooperative
transmissions suffer from drawbacks. With more relay nodes,
a higher order of diversity can be achieved improving the BER
and/or range with cooperative transmissions. However, at the
same time, security threats increase with the involvement of
additional parties to the communication. For example, even
if one of the nodes that form the virtual antenna array is
malicious, it can disrupt the transmission, or it can transmit
garbled symbols in order to both corrupt the transmission and
drain the batteries of honest nodes.
In this paper, we develop a framework for evaluating the per-
formance difference between using cooperative transmissions
or not for successful reception of packets in sensor networks
with a mix of honest and malicious and/or compromised
nodes. While this could apply for any multi-hop wireless
network, we consider here a sensor network with multi-hop
transmissions where key pre-distribution schemes may be
employed for security [3]. Even with key pre-distribution,
not all pairs of sensor nodes share a key, but many pairs
do. Thus, it is very likely that each SISO link on a route
from a source to the destination is secure when there are no
compromised nodes. The presence of compromised nodes will
however disrupt a path from the source to the destination and
data packets will not successfully reach the destination. As
the number of hops to the destination increases, the chance
of a successful reception at the destination drops. When
cooperative transmissions are employed with vMISO, for the
same link reliability, the number of hops to the destination may
be reduced making it more likely that the packet is successfully
received at the destination (see Figure 1). The reduction in
the number of hops increases as the number of cooperating
nodes increases. However, not all of the potential cooperating
nodes may share a key and/or some of these nodes may be
compromised or malicious. In such cases, vMISO may fare
worse than longer SISO links.
It is not easy to predict what circumstances are better
for vMISO or SISO for various reasons. First, the diversity
benefits increase with the number of cooperating relays, but
the relation is non-linear. Second, the chance of involvement
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the network and the distance between source and destination.
Third, various key pre-distribution schemes have different
probabilities of sharing secret keys with neighbors that may
act as relays. The contribution of this paper is an analytical
framework that includes these parameters so that it is possible
to evaluate the boundaries of where vMISO or SISO fare bet-
ter. We do however make simplifying assumptions (e.g., we do
not explicitly account for node density). Our analysis allowed
us to determine a general condition where vMISO has a better
probability of successfully delivering a packet than SISO as
nKv < Ks, where n is the number of cooperating nodes that
is used at each hop of a multi-hop vMISO route, and Kv and
Ks are the number of hops required to reach a destination from
the source with vMISO and SISO, respectively. This condition
holds when the number of honest nodes in the neighborhood
of a node is much higher than n. As expected, our analysis
shows that while using vMISO, a small n is preferable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we present some background and related work on cooperative
transmissions and some possible attacks against cooperative
transmissions. Section III describes the framework for analyz-
ing the probability of successfully receiving a packet at the
destination with SISO and vMISO, with and without the use
of shared keys. Section IV presents the results obtained from
the analysis. Section V concludes the paper and outlines its
limitations.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section we briefly describe the background material
needed for the rest of this paper and some related work.
We do not look at an exhaustive review of the literature on
cooperative diversity for which we refer to [1], [2], [4].
A. Cooperative Transmissions
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Fig. 1. Example of a SISO route and a vMISO route between a source and
destination node
Cooperative transmissions can improve the quality or range
of a link by creating virtual antenna arrays comprised of a
source and some of its neighbors. In a vMISO system, a
cluster of cooperating nodes emulate the antenna array of a
real MISO system [1]. There is a single head node in this
cluster that is the originator of data, and there are multiple
cooperating nodes each of which act as a transmitter antenna
in an antenna array. Unlike real MISO systems, antennas are
not co-located in vMISO systems. The source first broadcasts
or multicasts its packet to its neighboring relays and they
all then simultaneously transmit the packet to the receiver(s).
Once all nodes in the cluster have the original data, they
can encode data using an appropriate space-time block code
(STBC) [5], and simultaneously transmit the coded block to a
receiver. Figure 1 shows examples of SISO and vMISO routes
between a source S and a destination D. The SISO route is
4 hops long and goes through intermediate nodes f1, f2, f3.
The vMISO route is two hops long, but each hop has three
transmitters (S,R1, R2 for the first hop and f1, R3, R4 along
the second hop). The assumptions underlying the benefits from
vMISO are that each individual link (e.g., S to f1 or R2 to
f1) in Figure 1 is independently fading. Thus, the vMISO link
is more reliable because of the inherent diversity.
There are several physical layer related issues that we do
not elaborate upon here. It is possible to overcome these
challenges using physical layer techniques [1]. For example,
in order to leverage the benefits of space-diversity, data should
be encoded by a space time block code. An STBC with code
rate rn = k/kn, rn ≤ 1, is defined by a transmission matrix
of size kn × n, where n is the number of (virtual) transmitter
antenna elements and kn is the number of time units involved
in the transmission of k symbols [5]. The simplest STBC
is the Alamouti code, which has unit rate [6], n = 2 co-
located antennas or n = 2 cooperating relays, and transmitting
two symbols every two time units. STBCs suitable for higher
numbers of transmitter antennas or cooperating relays have
also been developed (see for e.g., [7]). In order to decode
the transmitted block successfully, the receiver node requires
channel state information (CSI) between itself and each of
the transmitting nodes. CSI is obtained by using pilot tones
transmitted by each node prior to the data transmission. Some
loose synchronization between S,R1 and R2 is necessary but
the impact of different node locations (as against colocated
antennas) has been shown to be minimal [1]. The individual
links are typically assumed to be flat-fading.
In this paper, we ignore the protocols and overhead associ-
ated with identifying nodes such as R1 and R2 at every link
as this has been previously considered in other work and is
also not the focus of this paper. For instance, in [1] a primary
SISO route is first created and then this primary route is used
to create a vMISO route. In [2], a greedy geographical routing
scheme is used. We also ignore the medium access issues
in this paper. Modifications to the traditional request-to-send
(RTS) and clear-to-send (CTS) handshakes to avoid collisions
and hidden terminals are possible [1].
B. Security Threats Against vMISO
Wireless ad hoc and sensor networks are vulnerable to
security attacks due to the shared nature of wireless medium
and the way they are deployed and their limited resources. Co-
operative transmissions are more vulnerable to some security
attacks than non-cooperative (SISO) transmissions, because
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with multiple transmitters. In this section, we will give a brief
explanation of potential attacks. Our focus later in the paper
is less on the attacks and more on the impact. Irrespective of
the cause of the attack, we assume that the goal of a malicious
or a compromised node is to disrupt the successful reception
of packets. Other attacks mentioned here (e.g., eavesdropping
or wormhole attacks) are outside the scope of this paper.
1) Disruption of Packet Transmission on vMISO Links:
vMISO transmissions can exploit space-time diversity by using
relay nodes. A relay node must agree to help a source node
which has a data to send to a destination node. When a relay
node behaves selfishly by not cooperating, a source node can-
not exploit the advantages of cooperative transmissions, and
instead it has to use SISO transmissions or transmissions with
fewer cooperating nodes. This may result in conditions such
as higher power consumption, longer latency in transferring
data and/or higher bit error rates. A selfish node that agrees
to cooperate but then does not transmit the packet with the
source and other relays reduces the diversity and will likely
result in a packet not reaching the destination reliably.
The number of relays is very important in cooperative
transmissions. Therefore, an attacker may try to prevent a
source node from choosing the right number of relays for
the cooperative transmission. Sybil attacks can be an example
for this kind of an attack. For example, a Sybil node can
claim more than one identity, which will cause the source
node to believe that it has n relays, while in reality it has
m < n relays. If STBC is used as part of the cooperation
scheme, the cooperative transmission simply is not realized.
If any other uncoded cooperation scheme is used, given certain
BER requirements, a source node cannot transmit its data to
the destination which is in the transmission range if there
are n nodes in the cooperation set, but outside the range
if there are m < n nodes. The necessity of symmetric
links in cooperative transmissions adds another problem to
the mix. For a symmetric cooperative link between source
and destination nodes, they both must have at least the same
number of relays. For example, if a source node has n relays,
the destination must also have at least n relays.
With a routing algorithm where the routing metric favors
nodes with higher numbers of relays, a malicious node may
try to convince others that it has a higher number of relays in
its neighborhood or that other nodes have fewer relays. This
way it may attract traffic to itself which then never reaches
the destination.
An attacker can jam the channel during the transmission of
pilot tones that are often needed with cooperative transmis-
sions in order to prevent successful estimation of CSI at the
receiver. In such a case, the receiver cannot decode symbols
successfully. Selectively jamming some transmissions will also
damage packets at the receiver. In addition, control packet
corruption attacks are possible that allow a malicious node to
disrupt the successful reception of a packet.
2) Other Attacks: One of the advantages of cooperative di-
versity is the increased transmission range with the same BER
requirement and power consumption as SISO transmissions.
However, this causes a single hop cooperative transmission to
have wider reception and interference ranges when compared
to those of SISO transmissions. Therefore, cooperation has
increased vulnerabilities in terms of overhearing due to the
larger transmission range. This can facilitate Rushing and
Wormhole Attacks. A wormhole attack may occur when a
malicious node captures a packet and replays it at another
location. A rushing attack may occur when a malicious node
does not wait for timers to timeout and replies before a
legitimate node. Obviously, the chances that a malicious node
can overhear a cooperative transmission is higher. In addition,
cooperative transmissions often require a more complex MAC
algorithm [1] which requires exchanging more messages than
needed for a direct transmission. This also increases the
probability of attacks that are related to packet capturing.
Methods that narrow down the transmission area without
decreasing transmission range in the desired direction, i.e.,
using directional antennas, may be useful.
Cooperative jamming introduces noise into the communica-
tion medium to hurt the eavesdropper (untrusted relay) more
than the legitimate destination. An example of such a solution
to mitigate the eavesdroppers in the transmission range is
given in [8], where an opportunistic selection of two relay
nodes is proposed to increase security against eavesdroppers.
The first relay operates as a conventional node and assists
a source to deliver its data to a destination via the Decode-
and-Forward strategy [9]. The second relay is used in order
to create intentional interference at the eavesdropper nodes.
The proposed selection technique jointly protects the primary
destination against interference and jams the reception at the
eavesdropper. This assumes knowledge of the existence of the
eavesdropper. In [10], the authors show that a positive secrecy
rate can be achieved with the help of destination node or an
external node that jams the relay by cooperative jamming.
Resource draining attacks aim to reduce or deplete the
network’s resources such as the battery power of nodes and the
capacity of the network, etc. A malicious node that is involved
in a cooperative transmission can attack the transmission to
drain the batteries of honest nodes, or occupy links by sending
garbage data for a longer time to decrease the capacity of the
network. Relay discovery attacks may result in high numbers
of retransmissions which will drain the batteries of nodes
and reduce the lifetime of the network. As mentioned before,
the nodes that reside in the wide transmission range of a
cooperation set (set of nodes cooperating) have to wait to be
able to send their own data. In a non-cooperative transmission,
a simple 4-way handshake is often enough to contend for the
channel; in the vMISO case, however, transmission latency
increases due to the message exchanging phase at the source
and destination clusters before cooperative control packets are
sent; also coding and decoding of symbols at the source and
destination add to the latency. Therefore, retransmissions must
be as few as possible to have a longer network lifetime.
In [11], two types of resource draining attacks are addressed.
In “inside” attacks, malicious nodes send garbage information
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attacks, a malicious node needs to report the link quality
or trust values. The malicious node can lie and report false
information. To mitigate both attacks in addition to selfish
behavior, [11] proposed a distributed trust-assisted cooperative
transmission scheme. Trust values are constructed to determine
the link quality between cooperating nodes and the destination
node. Relayed transmissions are combined at the destination
according to the trust values.
Injecting traffic attacks are addressed in [12]. These attacks
occur when attackers inject an overwhelming amount of traffic
into the network to consume good nodes’ valuable network
resources and reduce the network’s lifetime. In cooperative
mobile ad hoc networks, nodes will usually unconditionally
forward packets for other nodes. Consequently, such networks
are extremely vulnerable to injecting traffic attacks, especially
those launched by inside attackers. In [12], two types of
injecting traffic attacks that can be launched in cooperative
ad hoc networks are mentioned: query flooding attack and
injecting data packet attack (IDPA). Fortunately, in cooperative
ad hoc networks, since nodes belong to the same authority
and pursue common goals, it is possible that they can know
each other’s data packet injection statistics. According to the
solution proposed in [12], detecting injecting traffic attacks is
equivalent to detecting those nodes who are not legitimate, yet
they inject packets into the network or whose packet injection
rates are much higher than their legitimate upper bounds.
Also, legitimate nodes add a header to their packets along
with a signature. The maximum number of allowed hops and
signatures in the headers are used by honest nodes in order
to decide if there exists a malicious node on the route and
whether to forward a packet to the next hop or not.
C. Key Pre-distribution in Sensor Networks
One of the problems in the security of sensor networks is
that the nodes cannot store a lot of keys and it is not wise
to use a single key that every node shares as a single node
compromise can disrupt the whole network. To address this
problem, in [13], a key management mechanism is proposed,
and it has 3 phases: key pre-distribution, shared-key discovery,
and path-key establishment. The key-predistribution phase is
an offline phase, where a large pool of S keys are generated.
A key ring is generated from k keys that are randomly chosen
from this pool. Key identifiers for each key in the key ring are
loaded to a sensor node. In the shared-key discovery phase,
each node discovers its neighbors in communication range
with which it shares key(s). Nodes discover shared-keys by
broadcasting the list of key identifiers of the keys on their
key ring in clear text. After this phase, a secure link exists
between two nodes if they share at least one key. In path key
establishment phase, a path-key is assigned to selected pairs
of nodes in wireless communication range that do not share
a key but are connected by two or more links at the end of
the shared-key discovery phase. The downside of this random
key distribution scheme is that the probability that two nodes
share a key can be small.
The knowledge of the deployment of sensors [14] may
be used to improve this probability to something close to 1.
Multiple key pools are used in this deployment based scheme
as opposed to the single global key pool S. Sensors are
assumed to be deployed in clusters or groups organized into
a grid. Each deployment group has its own associated group
key pool that is generated from the global key pool. Keys from
the global key pool are assigned to group key pools in a way
that the group key pools of clusters that are geographically
closer have a certain number of common keys. However, if
two clusters are not neighbors, the group key pools do not
share any keys. Nodes that are very far apart are thus unlikely
to share any keys.
In this paper, we make use of these key pre-distribution
approaches to increase the reliability of SISO and vMISO
transmissions in the presence of malicious and/or compro-
mised nodes as explained in the following sections.
III. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PACKET SUCCESS
WITH VMISO AND SISO TRANSMISSIONS
In this section, we describe an analytical framework for
evaluating the probability of successfully delivering a packet
with SISO and vMISO transmissions in the presence of
malicious nodes in the system.
A. Outage Probability and Transmission Range
Based on [2], we first derive here an expression for the
relationship between the outage probability, the number of
cooperating nodes, and the increase in transmission range
possible with vMISO. We assume a narrow-band multi-path
wireless channel with a coherence time longer than the symbol
transmission time. This channel is modeled as a flat Rayleigh
fading channel with a path-loss exponent β. All nodes have
omni-directional antennas and emit signals at the same power
Pt. The large scale path loss for a transmitter-receiver distance
of d is, Kd−β , where K is a constant that is typically a
function of λ, the wavelength. For a certain packet trans-
mission, each transmitted signal goes over an independent
Rayleigh fading channel and it is corrupted by a zero-mean
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). Let α be a Rayleigh
distributed random variable with parameter σ = 1. We note
here that |α|2 has an exponential distribution. Under Rayleigh
fading with SISO, the signal strength Ss = P0d−βs |α|2 at the
receiver is exponentially distributed, where P0 = Pt×K. Here
ds is the distance between the SISO transmitter and receiver.
Let αi for i = 1, 2, · · · , n be independent random fading
coefficients with Rayleigh-distributed magnitude and uniform
phase. If there are n cooperating transmitters i = 1, 2, · · · , n
in vMISO at distances di from the receiver, the signal strength
Si of the i-th cooperating node’s signal at the receiver will
be P0|αi|2d−βi and the overall signal strength will be S =
P0
∑n
i=1 |αi|2d−βi . If we make the assumption that the di’s are
very close and equal to dv , the signal strength at the receiver
is Sv = P0d−βv
∑n
i=1 |αi|2. Note that
∑n
i=1 |αi|2 has a χ2
distribution with 2n degrees of freedom.
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instantaneous bit error rate (BER). It is well-known that spatial
diversity can help transmit with a lower total energy per
symbol, while satisfying the same BER requirement [15].
However, the analysis involving BER must assume a cer-
tain modulation class and involves complicated mathematical
functions. A more general way to capture the link quality is
through the outage probability, pout, defined as the probability
that the instantaneous signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR), SNRi, falls
below a certain threshold. If the coherence time is greater than
the packet transmission time, the outage probability is time-
invariant for a given packet transmission. Suppose that Sth
is the minimum required signal strength for correct decoding
at the receiver for a target outage probability pout (assuming
that the AWGN does not change with time). Then, the outage
probability for the random signal strength S at the receiver
can be calculated as,
pout = Pr [S ≤ Sth] (1)
For the same pout, SISO and vMISO will have different
transmission ranges as follows.
pout = Pr [Ss ≤ Sth] = Pr
[
P0d
−β
s |α|2 ≤ Sth
]
= Pr
[
|α|2 ≤ Sthd
β
s
P0
]
(2)
⇒ dβs = F−1s (pout)
P0
Sth
(3)
pout = Pr [Sv ≤ Sth] = Pr
[
P0d
−β
v
n∑
i=1
|αi|2 ≤ Sth
]
= Pr
[
n∑
i=1
|αi|2 ≤ Sthd
β
v
P0
]
(4)
⇒ dβv = F−1v (pout)
P0
Sth
(5)
where Fs(·) and Fv(·) are respectively the cumulative expo-
nential and χ2 (2n degrees of freedom) distributions previ-
ously mentioned. Thus, the gain in range for the same outage
probability [2] can be expressed as:
dv
ds
=
[
F−1v (pout)
F−1s (pout)
] 1
β
= Gn(pout, β) (6)
We note here that the number of cooperating nodes n
appears as an argument through the degrees of freedom of
the χ2 distribution.
B. Probability of Success without Malicious Nodes
First, let us suppose that a source node wishes to send
a packet to a destination node at distance D using only
SISO transmissions. Let the minimum number of hops given
an outage probability pout be Ks =
⌈
D
ds
⌉
. If there are no
malicious nodes in the network, the probability that a packet
is successfully received at the destination is equal to the
probability that the packet is successfully received on every
hop,
PSISOsuc = (1− pout)Ks (7)
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When vMISO transmissions with n cooperating nodes
at each hop are employed, the minimum number of hops
needed from the same source to the same destination becomes
Kv =
⌈
D
dv
⌉
=
⌈
Ks
Gn(pout,β)
⌉
≤ Ks. To calculate the success
probability with vMISO, we need to consider the SISO trans-
missions between source and relay nodes in addition to the
cooperative transmission to the destination node in every hop
of the multi-hop vMISO route. Then, the success probability
will be,
P vMISOsuc = (1− pout)nKv (8)
Theorem 1 (vMISO reliability without malicious nodes):
With no malicious nodes in the network and n cooperating
nodes to transmit a data from a source to a destination that is
Ks SISO hops away, vMISO has better transmission reliability
than SISO if Iv(n, pout, β) = n
⌈
Ks
Gn(pout,β)
⌉
−Ks < 0, given
an outage probability pout and path-loss exponent β.
Proof: When we compare (7) and (8), vMISO performs
better than SISO when,
P vMISOsuc > P
SISO
suc
(1− pout)nKv > (1− pout)Ks
nKv < Ks
Iv(n, pout, β) = n
⌈
Ks
Gn(pout, β)
⌉
−Ks < 0 (9)
Theorem 1 says that the performance of vMISO compared
to SISO depends on β, n and pout. It is not possible to simplify
this further easily due to the ceiling function used to calculate
the number of hops. We plot Iv = nKv − Ks in Figure 2
to show n and pout values for which vMISO is more reliable
than SISO, Iv < 0 (from Theorem 1), when β = 3. From this
figure, we observe that for vMISO to perform better, pout and
n must be small, or as pout gets larger, n must be smaller.
When β = 4, the ranges for n and pout for which vMISO is
better is narrower than for β = 3.
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Next we consider the setup of routes between sources and
destinations in the network and the impact that malicious
nodes may have on the probability of successfully receiving
a packet at the destination. We assume that source and des-
tination nodes are honest nodes and any malicious node will
participate in generating the route with the idea of dropping or
corrupting data packets later. Let γ be the fraction of honest
nodes in the network. Without any means of verifying whether
or not a node in the network is malicious, the probability of
picking a malicious node on a route depends on 1 − γ. We
further let δs be the degree of a node (the number of neighbors)
in SISO range ds. Then, δs consists of both honest nodes and
malicious nodes
δs = δh + δm.
When there is no mechanism to verify a node’s trustworthi-
ness, an honest node cannot differentiate between honest and
malicious neighbors; therefore, the fraction of honest nodes
is γ = δhδs . For a forwarding node to be on a “successful”
route from a source to a destination (i.e., packets are not lost
due to malicious activity), it should have at least 2 honest
nodes in its SISO range (the previous and the next node on
route). The probability that a source node chooses an honest
forwarding node f1 as the next hop node (from Figure 1) is
γ, and the probability that f1 chooses another honest node f2
(excluding the source node) will be 1− δmδs−1 . When δs >> 1,
this probability approaches γ = δhδs . Similarly, if the density
of nodes is high, and the fraction 1− γ of malicious nodes is
also high, for simplicity, we can assume that this fraction does
not change when a few nodes are already picked to be on a
route. Essentially then, the probability of picking a malicious
node as an intermediate node is 1− γ.
On a SISO route of length Ks hops, none of the Ks − 1
intermediate nodes (e.g., f1, f2, f3 in Figure 1) must be
malicious for the packet to be received successfully at the
destination. Thus we have,
PSISOsuc = (1− pout)Ks × γKs−1 (10)
When vMISO transmissions with n cooperating nodes are
employed, the computation of success probability is more
complex. This is because, in this case, each forwarding node
in vMISO range must be chosen from the honest neighboring
nodes, and in addition, each cooperating relay in SISO range
must be chosen from the honest nodes. Let Pn be the proba-
bility that an honest source node chooses n − 1 honest relay
nodes in its SISO range to cooperate with them in a single
hop vMISO. Then,
Pn =
(
δh
n− 1
)
(
δs
n− 1
) = γ × i=n−2∏
i=1
δh − i
δs − i . (11)
We note that Pn increases with increasing δh (and corre-
spondingly δs) although γ is constant. The reason is that the
probability of selecting n − 1 cooperating relays in a larger
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range is higher than in a smaller range. We analyze Pn for
different ranges of n and δh while keeping γ = δh/δs constant.
There are three cases we consider:
1) When δh →∞ and δh >> n, Pn → γ(n−1).
2) When n = 2, Pn → γ.
3) When n→∞, Pn → 0.
In Figure 3, we show Pn and γ(n−1), its approximation,
for simplifying the analysis for various n. The observations
from this figure validates that the approximation is very close
to the exact value of Pn. For small n, n < 10 the difference
is less than 0.01, and as n increases the error also increases.
However, even for n = 20, the error is less than 0.03.
In a multi-hop vMISO route of length Kv hops, there exist
Kv vMISO transmissions, and Kv−1 forwarding nodes. Then,
the success probability is given as,
P vMISOsuc = (1− pout)nKv × (Pn)Kv × γ(Kv−1) (12)
Theorem 2 (vMISO reliability with malicious nodes):
When there exist malicious nodes in the network, but no
mechanism exists to distinguish between them, using vMISO
with n cooperating nodes to transmit a data from a source to
destination at distance Ks SISO hops has better transmission
reliability if Iv(n, pout, β) = n
⌈
Ks
Gn(pout,β)
⌉
< Ks given
the same outage probability requirement, pout and path loss
exponent, β.
Proof: To simplify the analysis, we can compare P vMISOsuc
and PSISOsuc ((12) and (10)) under three different cases:
1) First case: γ << 1 − pout: This condition is similar
to the case when there are no malicious nodes in the
network, since the terms including γ in (10) and (12)
can be neglected. Pn in (12) can also be neglected since
it is also a function of γ. Then, this condition is in line
with Theorem 1.
2) Second case: 1 − pout = γ and Pn ≈ γ(n−1): This
condition is possible when δh →∞ and δh >> n which
results in Pn ≈ γ(n−1). Then (10) and (12) can be re-
7written as,
PSISOsuc = γ
2Ks−1 (13)
P vMISOsuc = γ
(2nKv−1) (14)
Then, comparing (13) and (14), vMISO performs better
than SISO when Iv = nKv −Ks < 0.
3) Third case: γ >> 1 − pout and Pn ≈ γ(n−1): Under
this condition, the (1− pout) terms in (10) and (12) can
be neglected, and they can be re-written as,
PSISOsuc = γ
Ks−1 (15)
P vMISOsuc = γ
(nKv−1) (16)
When we compare (15) and (16), vMISO performs better
than SISO if Iv = nKv −Ks < 0.
Note that in the presence of malicious nodes in the network
and without a mechanism (e.g., shared keys) to identify
malicious nodes, all three cases result in the same condition
Iv = nKv−Ks < 0 for a Kv hops vMISO route to outperform
a Ks hops SISO route in terms of successful packet reception
probability for given β and pout.
From Theorems 1 and 2, we observe that the condition for
multi-hop vMISO to outperform multi-hop SISO in terms of
success probability in the presence of malicious nodes and
with no mechanism for distinguishing between honest and
malicious nodes is the same as the condition for multi-hop
vMISO to outperform multi-hop SISO when there are no
malicious nodes in the network. This observation is a result
of the approximation made in calculating Pn.
D. Using Partial Trust with Malicious Nodes
In this section, we investigate the effect of employing shared
keys for trust between honest nodes in the network. Depending
on the type of key pre-distribution scheme, it is likely that
an honest node will share keys with some of its neighbors,
and not share any keys with some of them. Furthermore,
malicious nodes may compromise keys of honest nodes in
order to thwart the trust mechanism utilized between honest
nodes. The key sharing mechanism for trust and the key
compromising probability of malicious nodes may affect what
we call “the degree” of a node. This degree refers to the
number of neighbors that a node trusts based on shared keys,
even though some of them may be malicious. Let η be the
probability that two honest nodes share at least one common
key and Pm be the probability that an honest node shares a
common key with a malicious node in its SISO neighborhood.
Then, “the degree” of a node becomes
δ′s = δ
′
h + δ
′
m = ηδh + Pmδm.
We note that degree δ′s = δs when both key sharing and
key compromising probabilities are 1, η = Pm = 1. We
analyze successful packet reception with multi-hop SISO
and multi-hop vMISO with two different key predistribution
schemes: deployment-based scheme [14], and random key
pre-distribution [3]. The probability that a node shares a
common key with nodes in its neighborhood is larger with
TABLE I
DEPLOYMENT BASED KEY PREDISTRIBUTION
0 < d ≤ ds ds < d ≤ dv
No compromised nodes η 1 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
((7) and (8)) Pm 0 0
With compromised nodes η 1 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
((17) and (19)) Pm 0 ≤ Pm ≤ 1 0 ≤ Pm ≤ 1
the deployment based scheme [14] while it is smaller with the
random pre-distribution scheme [3].
1) Using deployment-based scheme: In the case of deploy-
ment based schemes, a node may share keys with its neighbors
with high probability (η ≈ 1, 0 < d ≤ ds), but not with nodes
that are far away (0 ≤ η < 1, d > ds). Assuming that an
intermediate node is not malicious, in such schemes, it is likely
that the complete route is safe. Then, the success probability
with SISO is only affected by the fraction of compromised
nodes Pm. Let the probability that an intermediate node in
SISO range is honest be γs =
δ′h
δ′s
= δhδh+δmPm (η = 1 and
δ′s >> 1). Then, the success probability on a SISO route of
length Ks hops is,
PSISOsuc = (1− pout)Ks × γKs−1s (17)
In single-hop vMISO transmission, the probability that a
source node chooses n − 1 honest nodes out of δ′s nodes in
SISO range is,
P ′n =
(
δ′h
n− 1
)
(
δ′s
n− 1
) = i=n−2∏
i=0
δ′h − i
δ′s − i
. (18)
For multi-hop vMISO, the probability that an intermediate
node in vMISO range is honest depends on η and will be
γv =
δ′h
δ′s
= ηδhηδh+δmPm (0 ≤ η ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Pm ≤ 1). Then, the
success probability is,
P vMISOsuc = (1− pout)nKv × (P ′n)Kv × γ(Kv−1)v , (19)
where in the calculation of P ′n, the key sharing probability
is η = 1, whereas in the calculation of γv , the key sharing
probability may be 0 ≤ η ≤ 1.
Now the success probability depends on γs and γv instead
of only γ in addition to pout, n and β. Following the second
condition in the proof of Theorem 2, let γs = 1 − pout and
P ′n ≈ γn−1s . When we compare (17) and (19):
P vMISOsuc > P
SISO
suc
γKv(2n−1)s × γ(Kv−1)v > γKs−1s
γ(Kv−1)v > γ
Ks−1−Kv(2n−1)
s (20)
(20) can be investigated under 3 different cases:
1) When η → 1, γv → γs; then, vMISO performs better
than SISO when Iv = nKv −Ks < 0 as in Theorem 2.
2) When malicious nodes do not have the ability to compro-
mise the keys of honest nodes (Pm = 0), γs = γv = 1
8TABLE II
RANDOM KEY PRE-DISTRIBUTION
0 < d ≤ ds ds < d ≤ dv
Without compromised nodes η 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
((7) and (8)) Pm 0 0
With compromised nodes η 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 0 ≤ η ≤ 1
((17) and (19)) Pm 0 ≤ Pm ≤ 1 0 ≤ Pm ≤ 1
and P ′n = 1, and the success probability with SISO and
vMISO are the same as (7) and (8) (when there are
no malicious nodes in the network), respectively. Then,
according to Theorem 1, vMISO is more efficient than
SISO when Iv = nKv −Ks < 0.
3) When Pm → η = 1 in SISO case, γs → γ; therefore,
success probability (17) approaches (10). Similarly, in
the vMISO case, when Pm → η, γv → γ and P ′n →
Pn; therefore, (19) approaches (12). We recall that (10)
and (12) are valid when there is no trust mechanism in
the presence of malicious nodes in the network. This is
expected when Pm = η, because the trust mechanism
cannot differentiate between malicious and honest nodes.
Table I summarizes the values appropriate for η and Pm
when deployment based key predistribution is used to trust
nodes with and without the presence of compromised nodes.
2) Using random key pre-distribution: In the case of ran-
dom key pre-distribution schemes, a node shares keys with
its neighbors and with nodes that are far away with equal
probability (0 ≤ η ≤ 1). Therefore, the success probability
of SISO is affected by both key sharing probability of honest
nodes, η, and the fraction of compromised nodes, Pm. The
success probability with SISO is given in (17) where the
probability that an intermediate node in SISO range is honest
is calculated from
γs =
δ′h
δ′s
=
δhη
δhη + δmPm
.
Similarly, in the case of vMISO, P ′n and γv are calculated
with given 0 ≤ η ≤ 1, and the success probability is given in
(19). Therefore, we can again use (20) for analysis:
1) With random key pre-distribution schemes, γs = γv .
Assuming P ′n ≈ γn−1s , vMISO is more efficient if Iv =
nKv −Ks < 0.
2) With no compromised nodes Pm = 0, γs = γv = 1
and P ′n = 1. Then, following the same analogy as in
the case with deployment based schemes, Theorem 2
is valid when random key pre-distribution schemes are
employed.
3) When Pm → η, γs → γ and γv → γ; therefore,
the success probability (17) approaches (10), and (19)
approaches (12). Therefore, Theorem 1 is valid when
random key pre-distribution schemes are employed.
Table II summarizes the values appropriate for η and Pm
when random key pre-distribution based scheme is used.
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IV. RESULTS
A. Success Probability Without Malicious Nodes
Figure 4 shows the probability of success with SISO and
vMISO transmissions with respect to n and Ks when β = 3
and pout = 10−3. While increasing Ks, ds is kept the same;
therefore, increasing Ks also means increasing the source-
destination distance D and the number of vMISO hops Kv .
We observe that P vMISOsuc is sometimes flat for several SISO
hops. This is because the same number of cooperating nodes
suffice for covering a few SISO hops. We also see that a
smaller number n of cooperating nodes is better when D is
small enough to be covered by a smaller number of SISO
hops. However, a larger number of cooperating nodes may
outperform SISO when the number of SISO hops is large
(larger D). A similar behavior is observed also in Figures 5
and 6, where success probabilities with SISO and vMISO
are shown for different values of β and pout. This behavior
was previously explained in Theorem 1. From these figures,
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Fig. 7. Psuc versus n and Ks, with malicious nodes, β = 3, pout = 0.001
the success probabilities for vMISO are reduced with higher
pout and β. We also observe a reduction in the number of
cooperating nodes for vMISO to be more efficient than SISO
with larger β although pout is kept the same.
B. Success Probability With Malicious Nodes
In Figure 7, we show PSISOsuc and P
vMISO
suc for various
values of Ks and n using (13) and (14). We have picked
pout = 1−γ = 10−3, and used β = 3 which provides moder-
ate distance gains with cooperative transmissions. Also, a high
number of honest node degree is assumed δh = 200 >> 1 for
approximating Pn ≈ γn−1. When compared to Figure 4, SISO
and vMISO success probabilities decreased approximately by
a factor of γKs−1 and γnKv−1, respectively. We emphasize
that since pout and β are the same for both cases, the relation
between performance comparison are the same for both cases,
Iv = nKv −Ks > 0 for n and Ks for higher vMISO success
probability.
In Figure 8, Psuc with SISO and vMISO are given for
β = 3, γ = 1 − pout. We pick the distance between the
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Fig. 9. Psuc versus n and Ks, with deployment based key predistribution,
β = 3, pout = 0.001
source and the destination nodes as Ks = 30 hops to create a
scenario to compare the results with δh = 200 and δh = 50.
We observe that the approximation Pn ≈ γn−1 provides a
success probability which is very close to its actual value.
Another observation is that with larger pout, the number of
cooperating nodes must be small n < 5 for vMISO to be
better.
C. Success Probability With Key Pre-distribution Schemes
Figures 9 and 10 show the success probabilities when
deployment based scheme is employed with pout = 1 − γ =
0.001. We picked Pm = 0.2, and η = 0.5 for d > ds in the
calculation of Psuc with vMISO. The observation is similar
to the one seen in Figure 7. In Figure 10, we plot Psuc with
different η and Pm values when Ks = 30 hops and δh = 50.
When η = 0.5 and Pm = 0.5, an honest node cannot commu-
nicate with half of the nodes that reside in its transmission
range, and it considers half of the malicious nodes in the
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hops
neighborhood as honest nodes. Therefore, this case has a lower
success probability compared to those achieved with η = 0.5
and Pm = 0.2 and η = 0.9 and Pm = 0.2.
Exactly the same scenario was created with random key
pre-distribution, and the results are shown in Figure 11.
When η = 0.5 and Pm = 0.5, the success probabilities
are lower than those with deployment based scheme due to
the reduction in “presumably honest node degree” in SISO
range with random key pre-distribution. The highest success
probabilities for given parameters are achieved when η = 0.9
and Pm = 0.2 as expected. We also see that the best number
of cooperating nodes is n = 4 for the scenario considered in
Figures 10 and 11. When n = 4, Gn(pout, β) = 7.5381 and
Iv = nKv −Ks = −14 < 0.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Cooperative transmissions exploit a fundamental feature of
the wireless medium: the ability to achieve diversity through
independent channels created between the multiple transmit-
ters and the receiver, because these channels are likely to fade
independently. With more relay nodes, a higher order of diver-
sity can be achieved improving the BER and/or transmission
range. However, at the same time, cooperative transmissions
suffer from drawbacks from a security point of view due to
the involvement of additional parties to the communication. In
this paper, we evaluate the tradeoffs between using cooperative
transmissions or not for reliable transmission of packets in
sensor networks with a mix of honest and malicious nodes.
We showed that when the number of honest nodes in the
neighborhood of a node is much higher than the number of
cooperating nodes (n), at high outage probability, vMISO with
small n outperforms SISO in terms of successful transmission
probability. We also derived a general condition (under simpli-
fying approximations) for all cases where vMISO outperforms
SISO.
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